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Abstract 
 
 
Tariff liberalization and its impact on tax revenue is an important consideration for 
developing countries, because they are increasingly facing the difficult task of implementing 
and harmonizing regional and international trade commitments. The tariff reform and its 
costs for Iranian government is one of the issues that are examined in this study. Another goal 
of this paper is, estimating the cost of trade liberalization. On this regard, imports value of 
agricultural sector in Iran in 2010 was analyzed according to two scenarios. For reforming 
nuisance tariff, a VAT policy is used in both scenarios. In this study, TRIST method is used. 
In the first scenario, imports' value decreased to a level equal to the second scenario and 
higher tariff revenue will be created. The results show that reducing the average tariff rate 
does not always result in the loss of tariff revenue. This paper is a witness that different forms 
of tariff can generate different amount of income when they have same level of liberalization 
and equal effect on producers. Therefore, using a good tariff regime can help a government to 
generate income when increases social welfare by liberalization. 
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1. Introduction 
 
Measuring the benefits of trade reform has been a frustrating endeavor. Although the 
discussion of trade policy at times gives the impression that a liberal trade regime can do 
wonders for a country's economy, and most observers believe firmly that trade reform is 
beneficial, yet systematic attempts at quantification fail to single out trade policy as a major 
factor in economic growth. The channels through which trade liberalization could bring 
benefits are broadly these: improved resource allocation in line with social marginal costs and 
benefits; access to better technologies, inputs and intermediate goods; an economy better able 
to take advantage of economies of scale and scope; greater domestic competition; availability 
of favorable growth externalities, like the transfer of know-how; and a shakeup of industry 
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that may create a Schumpeterian environment especially conducive to growth (Dornbusch, 
1992). 
 
On the other hand, tax revenue and tax policy are used to obtain national objectives. 
Normally, governments use tax revenue to provide the goods and services required to 
enhance economic growth and development, correct market failures, redistribute income and 
wealth and maintain macroeconomic stability. The latter is particularly important in small 
open economies which are highly dependent on the world economy such as developing 
countries (IMF, 2009). 
 
In developed countries, the personal income tax raises a large share of total tax revenue. In 
developing countries, however, it encounters serious difficulties as they are often 
characterized by large informal sectors. A large part of the labor force is employed in the 
agricultural sector or in small informal enterprises where incomes fluctuate and records are 
not accurately kept (Tanzi and Howell, 2001). The relative size of this informal sector is 
often three or four times larger in developing countries than in developed countries (Bird et 
al, 2008). Since ways of effectively taxing the informal transactions has not yet been found, 
the base for personal income tax is narrow in developing countries and levying high taxes on 
that base may enhance the existing distortions. The large informal sector, which also 
complicates the taxation on consumption, is one of the factors restricting the tax policy 
design of developing countries (Tanzi and Howell, 2001). 
 
Liberalizing trade and reforming the domestic tax system in order to recover the resulting 
government revenue loss could be a growth-enhancing process if carried out successfully. 
Trade theory tells us that trade liberalization leads to increased GDP and trade flows, which 
raises welfare through increased consumption opportunities. If the tax system is efficient 
enough, tax revenue grows in the same proportion and captures the gains from trade in the 
state budget. Generally, developing countries are advised to substitute their import duties 
with indirect taxes. As the tariff elimination leads to lower import prices, provided that there 
is competition keeping the producer from maintaining a higher price level, a commodity tax 
can be added without making the consumer worse off (Baunsgaard and Michael, 2005). 
Moreover, overall domestic consumption is broader than imports, implying that a shift from 
trade taxes to consumption taxes on substantially all commodities broadens the tax base and 
enhances horizontal equity in the system. 
 
The need of domestic tax reform in the context of trade liberalization is a result of tariff 
revenue being reduced. As tariffs are eliminated, revenue has to be collected from other 
sources. However, when tariffs are not eliminated but reduced, some of the resulting fiscal 
impact may be offset by an increase in imports (Hallaert, 2008). Even the revenue loss from 
an elimination of tariffs can be offset by the increase in imports when a VAT is levied on the 
import good and the increased import flow hence increases VAT revenue. This reasoning 
stems from the general assumption of trade liberalization leading to increased trade volumes. 
This assumption is in turn based on the assumption that tariff reductions lead to price 
reductions, boosting domestic demand for import goods. It should be noted that in order for 
this to be true, the import goods need to be somewhat price elastic. Moreover, one should 
keep in mind that lacking competition could hinder the tariff reductions from turning into 
price reductions; such market failure may allow companies to increase profits instead of 
lowering prices. In the cases where insufficient competition allows the import price reduction 
to accrue to the companies in the shape of profits, consumption is left unchanged and hence, 
so is VAT revenue. However, if the taxation is effective enough, the enterprises’ increased 
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profits could contribute to an increase in revenue from the corporate income tax, reducing the 
revenue loss (Ferreira, et al, 2006). 
 
In particular, tariff liberalization and its impact on tax revenue is an important consideration 
for developing countries, because they are increasingly facing the difficult task of 
implementing and harmonizing regional and international trade commitments. For many 
developing countries, tariffs and other import taxes provide significant sources of revenue. 
Having the capacity to equip policymakers with the means to project the adjustment impacts 
of trade reform is thus integral to developing effective trade reform strategies (Hamolton, 
2010). 
 
In Iran, as a developing country, because of government intervention in economic activities 
specifically in the field of trade policies, tariff as a trade instrument has not been applied 
correctly. Government usually uses non-tariff instruments for controlling imports and dealing 
with other countries has some rules which included in tariff applying too. Tariff regime in 
Iran is characterized by high average tariff (nominal and import-weighted tariff), an 
extremely high dispersion of tariff levels across tariff lines and a significant amount of tariff 
escalation (Chemingui and Dessus, 2008). Iranian economic history has been influenced by 
import substitution industrialization approach to develop and consequently agriculture sector, 
which a large part of the labor force is employed in, has been ignored compared to industry 
sector. Therefore, knowing the effects of trade adjustments in Iran is important especially in 
the large agricultural sector.  
 
Many general equilibrium studies have assessed the economic impacts of tariff reform and 
domestic complementary policies in developing countries. In a static general equilibrium 
model for Syria, B. Lucke (2001) studies different scenarios of preferential trade 
liberalization with the EU, and focuses on the effects of tariff reform on government budget. 
The study finds that government revenue losses caused by reduction in the EU import duties 
are fairly large, but still manageable. Omar Feraboli (2003) in a study on the effects of Jordan 
Association Agreement with the EU on macroeconomic variables found that the impact of 
trade liberalization on welfare is positive under all scenarios and also trade liberalization 
reduces government revenue, due to foregone import duties. Nashashibi (2002) provided a 
detailed outlook of revenue performance in Southern Mediterranean Arab countries. He 
acknowledged that there is higher trade protection in these countries than in other regions and 
pointed to the expectation that trade liberalization would lead to further decreases in 
revenues. Tosun (2005) in a study on Middle East and North Africa countries indicated that 
none of the major tax revenue sources were significantly impacted by the increased trade 
openness in the post-1986 period. In this paper, evidence is provided to show that there was a 
statistically significant move to domestic taxes on goods and services in trade liberalizing 
non-OECD countries. While this finding is supported for non-OECD countries in general and 
for other non-OECD countries excluding the MENA countries, it failed to materialize for the 
MENA countries. This suggests that the composition of available tax instruments in the 
MENA countries did not change in favor of those taxes that are thought to be welfare 
improving compared with international trade taxes. This could pose several problems for the 
MENA countries, such as lower economic growth, lower revenue available for economic 
development and high unemployment due to lack of job opportunities. 
 
In this paper, we want to assess the effects of trade liberalization and changes in tariff regime 
on the import of agricultural products in Iran and also its impact on tax revenue as a large part 
of government income.  
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2. Methodology 
 
In this paper we used a methodology that Work Bank has published in 2009. The name of the 
methodology is Tariff Reform Impact Simulation Tool (TRIST). The trade model in TRIST is 
based on the standard Armington (1969) assumption of imperfect substitution between 
imports from different sources. The model does not allow for direct substitution between 
products. The trade response to a change in tariffs for a given product from a given exporter 
is calculated based on the resulting percentage change in the duty inclusive price. One of the 
advantages of TRIST is that it uses actual import transactions data at the tariff line level to 
project trade reform adjustment costs. As such, it distinguishes between collected tariff 
revenue (which is calculated based on applied tariffs) and statutory tariff revenue. This allows 
for projections to be made using data on actual revenue collected as opposed to using revenue 
data based on statutory rates which do not reflect the tariff exemptions that are applied.  
 
Another feature of TRIST is that specific country groups can be developed to reflect relevant 
trading blocs and agreements. This enables tailored scenarios to be created for specific 
country groups while leaving trade with other partners unchanged. The trade model in TRIST 
is based on five core assumptions: First, the model is derived from standard consumer 
demand theory and utilizes elasticities to determine the magnitude of the demand response to 
the price changes that result from a tariff reform. Second, the calculations are based on the 
standard Armington (1969) assumption of imperfect substitution between imports from 
different trading partners since consumers distinguish products by the place of production. 
Third, the model does not allow for direct substitution between different products. Fourth, it 
is assumed that all changes in tariffs are fully passed on and that the world price remains 
unchanged. Fifth, the trade model in TRIST is a partial equilibrium model that treats demand 
for each product in isolation from the rest of the economy (Fernandez and Rodrik, 1997). 
TRIST is an Excel based tool that predicts the impact of tariff reform scenarios on the basis 
of a simple partial equilibrium model. It consists of two Excel files: the first is the Data 
Aggregation Tool which organizes and appropriately formats the data to be imported into the 
second, the Simulation Tool. It is assumed that all changes in tariffs are fully passed on and 
that the world price remains unchanged (infinite supply elasticity). The calculation of the 
price change depends on how a country applies its tariffs, excise and VAT. In most countries, 
tariffs are collected as a percentage of the C.I.F import value, excise taxes on the tariff 
inclusive C.I.F import value and VAT on the tariff and excise inclusive C.I.F import value. 
Thus, for a change in the tariff (with VAT and excise rates unchanged), the percentage 
change in the price of good i from exporter j is calculated as follows (subscript i is omitted on 
all arguments in the formula (Brenton et al, 2009):  
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Where: 
-change in price of imports from country j 
-price of imports from j before tariff reform 
 -price of imports from j after tariff reform 
 -world market price 
 -tariff rate applied to imports from country j before reform 
 -tariff rate applied to imports from country j after reform 
 -excise tax rate applied to imports from j 
-VAT rate applied to imports from j 
 
The trade response for a particular product is modeled in three consecutive steps: (1) the 
substitution between different exporters following changes in relative prices of different 
suppliers due to preferential tariff or duty changes, (2) the substitution between imports and 
domestic output as the relative price of overall imports of the product changes relative to 
domestically produced goods, and (3) a demand effect whereby consumption of the product 
changes in response to a change in the overall price of the product
[8]
. In this survey only first 
effect is calculated and others are supposed fixed. 
 
In the first stage we model the allocation of given expenditure on imports of a product across 
different country suppliers and how this allocation changes when tariffs and duties are 
amended (Brenton et al, 2009):  
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Where: 
 -imported quantity from j after exporter substitution step 
 -imported quantity from j before reform 
-exporter substitution elasticity for imports from country j 
 
 
3. Results and Discussion 
 
Required data for this study includes: the import quantity of products from partners, C.I.F 
prices of import products, added value of products, substitution elasticity between domestic 
and import products and substitution elasticity between exporters. We have used imports and 
tariff statistics data of Iran for the year 2010. Elasticity of substitution between different 
exporters is supposed to be 1.5. 
 
Two scenarios are assessing in this paper: 
1. Fixing tariff rates above 40% at 35%, fixing tariff rates above 20% and below or 
equal 40% at 30%, raising bands above 10% (5%) and below or equal 20% (10%) 
to 20% (10%), and fixing all nuisance tariffs at 5%.  
2. Eliminating tariff rates above 40%, fixing tariff rates above 20% and below or 
equal 40% at 35%, fixing bands above 10% (5%) and below or equal 20% (10%) 
to 20% (10%) and increases all nuisance tariffs to 5%. 
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Table1 Ranges of Tariffs in Two Scenarios 
Existing tariff First scenario  Second scenario 
Above 40% 35% 0% 
Between 20% & 40% 30% 35% 
Between 10% & 20% 10% 20% 
Between 5% & 10% 5% 10% 
Below 5% (nuisance) 5% 5% 
 
Unlike the papers done in this area, this paper doesn't suggest to eliminate nuisance tariff. We 
can use an added-value instead of them. Importing of agricultural products in Iran is based on 
"political considerations" not "economic considerations". So, in this survey another scenario 
for assessing the effects of a Preferential Trading Arrangements (PTA)is not studied. Now we 
want to see that between two scenarios which can change imports of agricultural products by 
the first effect in TRIST. 
 
The value of agricultural import products and the trade partners are presented in table 2. UAE 
is the country that exports the most agricultural products to Iran. It is clear that these products 
have not produced in UAE and there is no statistics to understand what the origin countries of 
these products are. Customs in some countries separate goods that are imported for re-export 
from that are for domestic consumption. For example, Lim and Saborowski(2010) in a paper 
on estimating trade related adjustment costs in Syria used CPC code for separating these two 
kinds of goods, but Iran's customs does not separate these goods. HS code is used in Iran.  
 
Table 2 Value of Agricultural Products Imports and the Share Of Trade Partners 
Country Export to Iran(1000 Billion 
Rials) 
Share (%) 
UAE 34.9 37 
Swiss 11.9 13 
Nederland 10.7 11 
Brazil 6.1 6 
Germany 4.9 5 
Total 94.1 100 
 
Table3 shows tariff income for different range of tariffs. The most income is generated from 
above 40% tariff rates. Nuisance tariffs are generated 19.8 percent of tariff incomes. This 
income doesn't cover its costs. So, one of the changes should be done in nuisance tariff, a 
change from which this income can be generated without any costs.  
 
Table 3 Tariff Income in Different Ranges of Tariffs 
Tariff ranges Income (1000 billion Rials) Share (%) 
Above 40% 6.95 54.1 
Between 20% & 40% 1.27 9.9 
Between 10% & 20% 1.95 15.1 
Between 5% & 10% 0.15 1.1 
Below 5%(nuisance) 2.54 19.8 
Total 12.86 100 
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Using TRIST method, changes in imports of agricultural products in different scenarios can 
be calculated as presented in table 4 and 5.  
 
Table 4 Results of First Scenario in TRIST (values are in Billiards Rial) 
Variables Value 
Import value (before) 94.1 
Import value (after) 119 
Changes 24.9 
Tariff income (before) 12.9 
Tariff income (after) 64.8 
Changes 51.9 
Average tariff (before) 24 
Average tariff (after) 16 
Changes -8 
                                                   
 
Table 5 Results of Second Scenario in TRIST (values are in Billiards Rial) 
Variables Value 
Import value (before)
* 94.1 
Import value (after) 119 
Changes 24.9 
Tariff income (before) 12.9 
Tariff income (after) 0.2 
Changes -12.7 
Average tariff (before) 24 
Average tariff (after) 12 
Changes -12 
 
 
As it can be seen in Table 4 and 5, values of agricultural product imports in both scenarios is 
equal and it is more than before. This shows that both scenarios have equal effects on 
producers and have lowered average tariff than before. So, both have a degree of 
liberalization. Also, the first scenario shows an increase in government income while the 
second one decreases it. This shows that different types of tariff are important for government 
income. Considering that both scenarios have equal import changes and the first one 
generates more income for government, the first scenario is better than the second one. 
Increase in government income when average of tariffs is decreased (according to the first 
scenario), is a surprising result. It is known that especially in developing countries openness 
has harmful results on economy and would decrease government income, but openness to 
international trade helps increasing tax incomes possibly by increasing employment, wage 
level, and corporate profits. It also has a contribution to the consumption tax possibly by 
spurring flows of goods within the country. In many studies, positive relationship between 
the degree of trade openness and trade tax means that openness possibly is a stimulus to 
higher volume of trade between countries and consequently increases trade tax receipts at the 
current level of the tariff rate. These are some of the papers that have obtained the same 
result: Brenton et.al (2007) used a partial equilibrium to estimate revenue impacts of tariff 
reform in COMESA. Their study seeks to contribute to discussions concerning the potential 
impacts on tax revenues resulting from a move to a customs union CU and the 
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implementation of an EPA. Results of this study showed that if all tariffs were to be removed 
on imports from EU, tariff revenue would be increased by 24.6% for Zambia and 26.2% for 
Malawi. Pupongsak (2009) investigated the trade and revenue impact of trade liberalization 
and argued that the effect of trade openness on both trade tax and domestic taxes emphasizes 
the fact that, for low and middle income countries, not only is their trade sector highly 
dependent on international sector, but also their entire economic structure will be affected if 
there is any change in countries’ international trade system. Also a change which leads to an 
increase in trade volume will consequently benefit these countries’ taxation. Thus, although 
overall results suggest that trade liberalization via increasing trade openness generally has a 
contribution to taxation in all countries; the degree of its benefit depends on the country’s 
level of economic development and economic structure. In the lecture review, there are also 
some studies that have vice versa results. For example, Andriamananjara et.al (2009) 
assessed the economic impact of an EPA on Nigeria and showed that an EPA will decrease 
tariff and VAT revenue at least -13.5%. So, effect of liberalization differs from one country 
to another and also from one scenario to another. Decreasing in tariff amount can decreases 
government income in a country or increases that. Our results show that for Iranian economy, 
a decrease in tariff according to the first scenario can increase the government revenue, while 
by the second one it will decrease the government income. 
 
4. Conclusion 
 
Governments in developing countries usually believe that liberalization and decreasing tariffs 
amounts has a big cost. So, some studies are needed for estimating these costs. Word Bank 
suggested a method named TRIST for using different scenarios. The trade model in TRIST is 
based on the standard Armington (1969) assumption of imperfect substitution between 
imports from different sources. The trade response for a particular product is modeled in 
three consecutive steps in TRIST: (1) the substitution between different exporters, (2) the 
substitution between imports and domestic output, and (3) a demand effect whereby 
consumption of the product changes. In this study, trade related adjustment costs for Iran is 
estimated. From the three effects that are mentioned, only first one is estimated. Others are 
supposed fixed. Two scenarios were analyzed for changing tariff amounts. Two scenarios 
were assessed: 
 
1. Fixing tariff rates above 40% at 35%, fixing tariff rates above 20% and below or 
equal 40% at 30%, raising bands above 10% (5%) and below or equal 20% (10%) to 
20% (10%), and fixing all nuisance tariffs at 5%.  
2. Eliminating tariff rates above 40%, fixing tariff rates above 20% and below or 
equal 40% at 35%, fixing bands above 10% (5%) and below or equal 20% (10%) 
to 20% (10%) and increases all nuisance tariffs to 5%. 
 
Both of them had an equal tariff average.  
 
After using TRIST, results showed that values of imports in both scenarios are equal and they 
are more than before. This shows that both scenarios have equal effect on producers. First 
scenario shows an increase in income of government when second one decreases it. So, 
different forms of tariff are important for generating income for the government. Both 
scenarios have an equal import changes and the first one generates more income for 
government, so the first one is better. Both scenarios have lowered average tariff than before. 
So, both of them have a degree of liberalization. This paper is a witness that different forms 
of tariff can generate different amount of income when they have same level of liberalization 
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and equal effect on producers. Therefore, using a good tariff regime can help a government to 
generate income when increases social welfare by liberalization. So, according to the results 
these suggestions are for the government:  
 
1. All kind of liberalizations don't have a decreasing effect on government revenue. 
This effect should be estimated before implementing every policy.  
2. Nuisance tariffs don't generate revenue for the government. A policy that 
eliminates them and uses VAT should be implemented.  
 
As mentioned above, in this paper only one of the effects in TRIST model is estimated. It can 
be a weakness of this paper. So, estimating other two effects can be estimated by other 
researchers. It can be a good subject for other papers. 
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